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Refugee Trafficking in a Carceral Age: A Case Study of the Sinai Trafficking 
Abstract 
Since 2007, tens of thousands of Eritreans escaping widespread repression, open-ended 
national service, and socio-economic deprivation have reached the Sinai Peninsula hoping to 
cross the border into Israel. Early on, voluntary smuggling facilitated refugee crossings. 
Around 2009, however, smuggling became a notorious trafficking network, referred to as 
Sinai trafficking. Hostages were raped, tortured, and murdered. This human tragedy continued 
for several years, unknown to the outside world, and was, strikingly, not acted upon, even 
once discovered. No criminal investigation was taken after its discovery. How and why do the 
torture, death, and reports of organ trading of thousands of innocent refugees go ignored? In 
this article, I look into why it might be that the Sinai trafficking has gone unpunished, 
concluding that it is because the victims, had, due to their circumstances, come to be regarded 
merely as ‘bare lives’. 
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Introduction  
Since 2007, tens of thousands of Eritreans escaping widespread oppression and 
incessant violence have reached the Sinai Peninsula, hoping to enter Israel. Early on, 
voluntary smuggling operations were de facto regulators to move Eritreans and other sub-
Saharan migrants across borders. Since 2009, however, voluntary smuggling became a 
unique and notorious trafficking plot (Simpson, 2014, p. 22). This shift is partly attributed to 
the spread of the “Arab Spring” and the political turmoil it caused in Egypt and Libya, which 
created a security vacuum, allowing human trafficking to flourish (van Risen & Mawere, 
2017). The insecurity, power struggles between militia groups, and spread of “terrorism-
 
 
related” groups have  created suitable environment for “new practices of human trafficking” 
(see van Risen & Mawere, 2017, p. 159 ).   
In 2012, Israel closed its border, which contributed to smugglers losing income. With 
this income loss, smugglers began to take refugees hostage and require ransoms. Hence, the 
closure of the Israeli border “created new risks for the survivors of abduction by traffickers, 
shooting and imprisonment by Egyptian border guards, as well as eventual deportation back 
to Eritrea” (van Reisen & Mawere, 2017, p. 77). The shift is also associated with an increase 
in ransom for the victims. The traffickers demanded a ransom of $30,000–$50,000 per person 
from the victim’s families (van Reisen et al., 2012, p. 39). The smuggling quickly developed 
into a lucrative, clandestine business. This attracted many more participants, including 
organized criminals and rogue state actors (see Simpson, 2014).  
Sinai trafficking has taken thousands of innocent refugees to a realm of active, 
unrelenting, and egregious violence to extort for ransom. Hostages were raped, burned with 
melted plastics, beaten, and tortured to death. This suffering continued for several years in 
obscurity. When human rights activists and journalists exposed notorious scenes of innocent 
bodies subjected to excruciating pain, it was still ignored. The impunity given to this tragedy 
implied that the refugees had lost any form of protection. This article scrutinizes the 
relationship between the status of the trafficking victims and the impunity of persecution for 
the crimes committed against them.  
Background  
 There is a connection between past colonial ravages and the present nation-state 
hegemony, in which the current Eritrean government continues to oppress its people. The 
United Nations Commission of Inquiry (COI) on Human Rights in Eritrea reported that 
“Eritrean officials have engaged in a persistent, widespread and systematic attack against the 
country’s civilian population since 1991” (Human Rights Council COI, 2016, p. 83). The 
 
 
report highlighted mass militarization, mass incarceration, and forced disappearance of 
civilians. It found that the state imposed indefinite national service, where people from both 
sexes, aged 18–50, were forced to enlist (van Reisen et al., 2012, p. 28). It also revealed that 
national service conscripts worked in dehumanizing conditions for minimal remuneration. To 
describe the situation of Eritrean national service conscripts, van Reisen (2016, p. 9) notes: 
the situation remains difficult because of low pay, […] inability to support 
themselves and their family, […] lack of acceptance of conscientious objections, 
lack of freedom over life decisions, inability to live a family life and participate in 
marriage and the raising of children, protracted ill treatment, imprisonment and 
detention without access to the legal system and rule of law, and […] random 
imprisonment and detention, and collective punishment. 
Furthermore, the country isolated itself from media coverage to avoid international 
scrutiny. In doing so, the Eritrean government turned the country into an “open air prison” by 
suspending the rule of law and closing all media outlets except the strictly censored national 
media (van Reisen et al., 2014, p. 280). The widespread repression, open-ended national 
service, and socio-economic deprivation in Eritrea triggered a mass emigration of people 
seeking international protection as refugees (Andom, 2018; Kibreab, 2013; Mekonnen & 
Estefanos, 2011; Simpson, 2014). Many Eritreans crossed into neighboring countries, such as 
Sudan and Ethiopia, in search of safety. As of 2013, “about 130,000 Eritreans [had] 
registered as refugees in eastern Sudan’s refugee camps and tens of thousands more [had] 
registered in Ethiopia’s camps” (Simpson, 2014, p. 17). However, the asylum countries not 
only lacked adequate protection for refugees but also actively created a culture of exclusion 
to deliberately discourage immigration. In the immediate transit countries, detention and 
deportation constituted a constant threat for refugees (see Bahlbi, 2016). Given the repressive 
nature of the Eritrean government, deportation poses a serious concern among Eritrean 
 
 
refugees in neighboring countries. The Human Rights Watch (HRW), for example, reported, 
“On October 17, 2011, Sudan handed over 300 Eritreans to the Eritrean military without 
screening them for refugee status” (HRW, 2011). Despite public condemnation by the 
UNHCR, the Sudanese government “repeatedly forced back Eritrean asylum-seekers and 
refugees to Eritrea, where they risk persecution” (UNHCR, 2011).  
Moreover, refugees have been subjects of protracted containment without adequate 
service and safety in Sudan and Ethiopian refugee camps. Those who managed to claim 
asylum were deprived of adequate basic needs, freedom of mobility, and employment rights 
while being exposed to abduction and kidnapping by human traffickers (Simpson, 2014, pp. 
17–20). This led the Eritrean refugees to increasingly avoid refugee camps to engage in 
secondary movements. Citing “confidential” HRW communication with refugees in the 
region, Simpson (2014) explains: 
Two possible explanations are that fewer Eritreans reach the camps because they 
fear being kidnapped by traffickers and therefore avoid eastern Sudan entirely, or 
because an increasing number are kidnapped as soon as they cross the border 
before they have a chance to reach the camps, (p. 17) 
Furthermore, Eritrean refugees were exclusively subjected to differential treatment based on 
their religious and socio-economic backgrounds. This has been the case in majority Muslim 
countries, such as Sudan and Libya. Muslim hostages were treated better, had to pay reduced 
ransoms, were provided with opportunities to work as interpreters, and eventually received 
chances to escape (van Reisen et al., 2012, pp. 57–60). On the other hand, Christian victims 
were nicknamed Kafirun, meaning infidels, and were subjected to moral, religious, and 
emotional discrimination. Often, “women are forced to convert to Islam…to bear children to” 
organized criminals and terrorist fighters (van Reisen & Mawere, 2017, p. 188).  
 
 
Thus, the practices of detention, deportation, containment, inadequate services, and 
discrimination pushed many Eritrean refugees to undertake secondary journeys in search of 
safety. Hoping to live a dignified life elsewhere, refugees continued to travel from Sudan and 
Ethiopia to Israel and Europe. They were continually met with “violent borders” (Jones, 
2016) in their attempts to reach these destinations. While Israel had its borders closed to such 
migrants, European states deployed extraterritorial borders to halt incoming refugees. These 
deterrence policies rapidly increased the cost of and demand for Eritrean refugee smuggling. 
Bahlbi (2016, p. 219), for example, suggested that the main route to Europe —that is, 
“Sudan–Libya–Europe”—had become very expensive and risky. This might have triggered 
the shift of the destination from Europe to Israel. 
As the Sudan–Libya–Europe route became increasingly precarious, desperate 
refugees, facilitated by smugglers, began to arrive in Israel in large numbers (see Bahlbi, 
2016). As Israel also closed its borders, the relationship between refugees and smugglers 
reached an all-time low, shifting from consensual to deceptive and coercive, as refugees and 
asylum seekers were either kidnapped or blackmailed by smugglers on their journeys. 
Smugglers then sold their captives to traffickers, who traded victims for higher ransoms, 
torturing and sexually abusing them. Soon, the direct kidnapping of refugees from camps in 
Sudan and Ethiopia became common practice (Bahlbi, 2016; Fisseha, 2015; Simpson, 2014; 
van Reisen et al., 2012). Constitutively excluded from any form of protection, “Eritrean 
refugees have become a valuable commodity throughout the North African region” (van 
Reisen & Mawere, 2017, p. 188). 
 The isolated Sinai Peninsula became a suitable destination for the exploitation of 
Eritrean refugees. Sinai, an Egyptian territory situated on the Asian continent, is located 
between the Mediterranean and Red Seas. It is inhabited by native Bedouins and  has a long 
history of tourism and desert recreation. After 2009, however, it became a deadly desert for 
 
 
refugees. From 2009 to 2013, “25,000—30,000” refugees were believed to have been 
trafficked to the Sinai desert (van Reisen et al., 2013, p. 64). It is estimated that 25% to 50% 
of the victims died from extreme torture (see van Reisen et al., 2013, pp. 62–63). Between 
15,000 and 25,000 victims have survived the tragedy (van Reisen & Mawere, 2017, p. 274).
 One widely held narrative is that the Sinai victims of trafficking were recruited by 
armed criminals from the Rashaida tribe in Eritrea and Sudan and enslaved by Bedouins in 
Sinai. This narrative, which features the Rashaida and Bedouins as the drivers of the Sinai 
trafficking, overlooks the multiple actors involved in the complex trafficking chain. In fact, 
the Rashaida and the Bedouins are forgotten minorities. The Rashaida lead an unstable life, 
both in Eritrea and Sudan. They depend on cross-border illicit trade for their survival.  
The Bedouins of Egypt are marginalized people. Fisseha (2015) notes that “The 
conditions for the Bedouin tribes that perpetrated the crimes were little better [than that of the 
refugees] … over half of the Bedouin tribes were living in poverty” (p. 10). These minority 
tribes were left with no other means of survival but the trafficking of people, drugs, and 
weapons. Their people were adrift from political life, often exercising insignificant 
citizenship rights. However, the threshold at which these marginalized tribes ceased to 
become politically significant was ambiguous. They had slipped between the “illegitimate” 
and the “legitimate”—a kind of no man’s land orchestrated by rogue state powers, in which 
the justice system no longer existed. 
The distinction between refugees and the minority tribes is in the balance of power 
between them. Unlike the refugees, who lost everything in their struggle for safety, the 
Rashaida and Bedouins benefited from organized smuggling and trafficking. Operating at the 
“threshold of the law” (Salter, 2008), the minority tribes began to exploit the refugees for 
their survival. In doing so, they colluded with facilitators among the local people, refugees, 
border guards, security police, financial institutions, humanitarian workers in refugee camps, 
 
 
and many isolated nomads who nourished trafficking (van Reisen et al., 2012; van Reisen & 
Mawere, 2017). They worked with military commanders from Eritrea, Sudan, and Egypt in 
the recruitment and transfer of refugees (Simpson, 2014; van Reisen et al., 2012; van Reisen 
& Mawere, 2017). Simpson (2014, pp. 42-43) notes: 
Sudanese traffickers handed victims over to members of Egyptian military or 
police, who then transferred them to Egyptian traffickers; at the Suez Canal […] 
Egyptian policemen […] allowed trucks filled with trafficking victims to cross 
the canal’s only bridge for vehicles; at traffickers’ houses […] Egyptian military 
personnel intercepted escaped trafficking victims and returned them to traffickers; 
and the Israeli border […] Egyptian soldiers met with traffickers who had 
released their victims and helped the victims cross the border,  
Simpson (2014, p. 28) adds:  
In 13 of the cases documented or reviewed by Human Rights Watch, the 
Eritreans said that Sudanese police detained them in 2011 or 2012 and then 
handed them over to traffickers. Eight of them said that the handover to the 
traffickers happened inside or just outside a police station in Kassala town. 
Sinai trafficking is a tragic story of refugees who lost their humanity and the rights that 
come with it. Van Reisen (2014) described refugee trafficking as “crimes against life 
itself” (p. 281), with Fisseha (2015) similarly suggesting that it constituted elements of 
“crimes against humanity,” “genocide,” and “war crimes.” The argumentation of this 
paper is informed by Agamben’s (1995, 1998) theorization of “bare life,” Foucault’s 
(2020) notion of “carceral system,” and Arendt’s (2017) conceptualization of the “right 
to have rights.” I propose, alongside Agamben, that Sinai victims were not only relegated 
to a destitute status but also banished into a realm of active and unpunished violence. 
Equally relevant to this argument is Foucault's (2020) discussion of the “carceral system” 
 
 
and how it relates to Mbembe's (2019) “necropolitics”—the politics of death. Arendt 
adds a human rights element to both Foucault’s and Agamben’s arguments. In short, 
these concepts and theories allow this paper to go beyond the human rights approach to 
critically examine the multifaced relations and mutations of the “carceral system” in 
perpetuating impunity and rightlessness. 
Methodology 
Procedures 
 Having previously worked for the UNHCR and other local Egyptian organizations, I 
had an extensive network of active community members as well as staff working for the 
humanitarian organizations. These networks enabled me to recruit interviewees through their 
local connections. On arrival in Cairo, I volunteered at the Eritrean refugee community center 
and recruited ten interviewees, most of whom were service users at the center. The 
community center organized various social, sporting, and learning events for Eritrean 
refugees in Cairo. In addition, I visited another local organization called St. Andrew’s 
Refugee Services (StARS). I worked at StARS previously, so I knew many of the staff and 
volunteers. I recruited nine interviewees: two StARS volunteers and seven StARS service 
users. 
In total, I conducted semi-structured interviews with nineteen Sinai trafficking 
survivors between May and July of 2017; interviewees were asked open-ended questions. 
These face-to-face interviews lasted between 45 minutes and 90 minutes. The interviews 
were all recorded on an encrypted external hard disk. They were conducted at either the 
Eritrean refugee community center or the StARS venue. Over half of the interviewees (eleven 




 This paper draws data both from primary and secondary sources. Among the 
survivors of Sinai trafficking interviewed for this research were young men and women, 
single mothers, single fathers, and formerly unaccompanied refugee children. The 
interviewees were between 21 and 59 years old, with over half of them younger than 35. 
Among the interviewees were two single mothers, each with two children, and a single father 
with one child. 
The article focuses on Eritrean survivors of Sinai trafficking for two reasons. Many of 
the victims of Sinai trafficking (about 95%) are Eritreans, with the remaining 5% coming 
from Somalia, Ethiopia, and Sudan (van Reisen et al., 2012, p. 1). Second, it was extremely 
difficult to access informants from other communities; there is little data available about 
them. Similarly, due to the political sensitivity of the topic and the exceptional vulnerability 
of some survivors, no interviews were conducted with children or detainees. Involving 
participants who were traffickers or smugglers was impossible because it might have 
compromised my safety as a trafficking survivor. 
I synthesized the primary data with data from previous research, mainstream media 
products, and other reports. The bulk of the existing literature on Sinai trafficking is produced 
by academic activists (e.g., Fisseha, 2015; Mekonnen & Estefanos, 2011; van Reisen et al., 
2012, 2013), human rights organizations (e.g., HRW, UNHCR), and media reports (e.g., 
CNN). This existing knowledge of Sinai trafficking focuses on establishing proof of human 
rights violations and producing reports. During the field study, I was reminded that survivor 
accounts were being used by journalists and human rights activists without any effect on their 
lives.  
 The survivors’ acute awareness of the impunity with which the trafficking of refugees 
was treated and their skepticism informed this research inquiry. The research approach and 
 
 
theoretical framework of this paper reflect the survivors’ calls for a rethinking of Sinai 
trafficking. At the center of its inquiry is the status of the pained bodies in modern political 
life. This paper investigates the impunity with which the horrific crime of the Sinai 
trafficking was perpetrated.  
Data Analysis 
For analysis, I began with Srivastava and Hopwood’s (2009, p. 79) “iterative 
framework” to examine the “dialectical relationship” between the data and the research 
inquiry. Like Srivastava and Hopwood, I started the analysis process by examining what the 
interviewees’ accounts said, what I wanted to know, and the dialectics between the two. After 
thoroughly engaging with the interviewees’ accounts, existing literature, and various reports, 
I relied on a thematic analysis to situate the findings in broader literature and theoretical 
frameworks. I chose to focus on two overlooked features of the Sinai trafficking: the 
impunity with which the refugee trafficking was committed and the status of such a group of 
people in modern political life. I also shed light on the visceral pain the refugees have gone 
through in the “torture camps” in Sinai and during their perilous journeys.  
Ethics 
From the outset, research ethics and reflexivity have been critical aspects of the 
design of this research. As an insider with field research and professional experience, I 
approached the interviewees with service-oriented skills, fieldwork experience, and ethical 
understanding. In my previous work in Egypt, I processed hundreds of testimonies from Sinai 
trafficking survivors between January 2013 and October 2015. Thus, I was aware of the 
potential risks involved in conducting research with the survivors and the best practices to 
mitigate such risks.  
 
 
I took all the necessary ethical precautions to ensure confidentiality and safeguard the 
rights of interviewees before I began gathering data. These included, but not limited to, 
conducting vulnerability and risk assessments in line with the standard operating procedures 
of the organizations whose venues I used for interviewes. In addition, I adhered to 
“procedural ethics” (Guillemin & Gillam, 2004) (e.g., university research integrity and ethics 
guidelines) and vulnerability and risk assessment protocols of the organizations that the 
interviewees relied on. In practice, the organizational protocols exceed procedural ethics, 
particularly when obtaining informed consent and interviewing the survivors. Personal 
details, participant names, and any potentially identifiable information have been censored.  
Results 
Abduction and Kidnapping  
 Fourteen of the 19 (74%) survivors interviewed for this research described their 
former traffickers linked with Sudanese and Egyptian border security guards. Their accounts 
were consistent with the large number of survivor testimonies chronicled by human rights 
organizations and literature reviewed for this research. The survivors explained that Sudanese 
border security officers arrested them and handed them over to Rashaida, who then “sold” 
them to Bedouins in Egypt. Sergel, for example, recalled: 
I was arrested near the city of Kassala by Sudanese police and they transferred 
me to Rashaida. After two weeks of driving us through a desert, the Rashaida 
sold me to an Egyptian trafficker who took me to the Sinai where I was tortured 
for ten months… I saw the Egyptian trafficker, who tortured me for ten months 
and killed two of my cousins, driving a very nice car in downtown [Cairo]. When 
I reported it to the UNHCR, they could do nothing… The UNHCR officer told 
me to change my address and phone number… When I tried to report it to the 
 
 
police, a police officer advised me that I could be deported to Eritrea if I talked 
about the trafficker. He [the police officer] said the trafficker is linked with 
powerful government workers… I never returned to the police station again.  
 Without a doubt, border and security guards, military commanders, and police were 
involved in Sinai trafficking as intermediaries between the traffickers and the violent 
sovereign power. They operated at the threshold of state power, in a no man’s land where 
incessant violence and torture became the norm. These rogue powers acted as an impetus for 
trafficking and as a shield for the criminals. From this point of view, the exploitation of 
refugees in an illicit business model was rooted in the violent power relations between the 
state actors and the traffickers. The refugees were caught in a critical juncture between the 
sovereign power, whose prime concern was to exclude them, and the traffickers, whose sole 
agenda was to maximize exploitation. 
The source, transit, and destination states not only deny the involvement of state 
actors in the trafficking but also refuse to recognize the plight of refugees in Sinai. For 
example, when the COI attempted to investigate the crime of refugee trafficking in Sinai, the 
Egyptian government refused to issue a visa for the UN Special Rapporteur (Fisseha, 2015, p. 
17). The country maintained its denial of the occurrence of such crimes. Denial by the origin 
and transit countries involved, and the silence of the rest of the world, meant that the 
enslavement of Sinai victims remained an issue that has vanished from view. Set apart from 
any form of legitimate status, the refugees were forced to succumb to the ruthless, illicit 
business of human trafficking. 
Another uniquely poignant feature of Sinai trafficking is the kidnapping of refugees 
from refugee camps. Refugee camps in Eastern Sudan and Ethiopia have become bases for 
refugee recruitment into trafficking. For example, interviews recorded by van Reisen et al. 
(2012) show how refugee camps in Sudan and Ethiopia became breeding grounds for 
 
 
traffickers and insecure destinations for refugees. Moreover, two informants interviewed for 
this study confirmed that they were kidnapped from the Shagarab refugee camp in Eastern 
Sudan and claimed that the camp’s security guards were involved in their abduction. 
The irony of the camps providing refuge in the transit countries is that they exposed 
those contained within them to greater threats. Refugees were kidnapped from these spaces 
where they were supposed to be protected, causing asylum-seekers to doubt the sincerity of 
the security guards. This created long-term anxiety, ambiguity, and uncertainty for the 
refugees. The ultimate function of the camps and the humanitarian organizations has been 
containing the refugees in isolated spaces outside of the political community. By isolating the 
refugees in camps, humanitarian organizations “maintain a secret solidarity with the very 
powers they ought to fight” (Agamben, 1998, p. 78). The clandestine activities in the refugee 
camps deeply reflect the inhumanity within humanitarian and international organizations.  
The recruitment of refugees into Sinai trafficking is not a crime solely committed by 
human traffickers. As shown, refugees were recruited for the trafficking by state and non-
state actors from source, transit, and destination countries. Facilitated by communication 
technologies, these actors were interconnected in a chain of violent power relations. As van 
Reisen and Mawere (2017) persuasively argue:  
The modus operandi are facilitated by information communication technologies 
(ICTs): ransoms and other financial transactions are negotiated with relatives 
over the phone who contribute to the release and support of the refugees through 
mobile money transfers, while trafficking networks make extensive use of ICTs 
to coordinate logistics as well as global financial transactions (p. 4). 
“The trafficking networks,” add van Reisen and Mawere (2017), “operate at the global level, 
making maximum use of the flexibility that ICTs provide in managing and overseeing their 
operations” (p. 12). Thus, Sinai trafficking thrived in a chain of intricate relations that 
 
 
included locals, refugees, and powerful state and non-state actors. This suggests structural 
and systematic neglect at national and international levels.  
Treatment of Hostages in “Torture Camps” 
 Yemane, a 21-year-old survivor of the Sinai tragedy, was born in a small village in 
Eritrea. He started schooling at an early age and completed primary education at the age of 
15. Unfortunately, he could not continue beyond primary school because of family problems. 
A year after dropping out of school, Yemane was called for national service by his local 
government. Yemane, however, did not want to join the open-ended national service. Instead, 
he fled Eritrea to Sudan. Unfortunately, Yemane was kidnapped by Rashaida traffickers in 
Eastern Sudan immediately after crossing the border. He was blackmailed in a chain of 
trafficking before he ended up in Sinai. There, Yemane was put in a Mekhzen (“torture 
camp”) with nine other hostages. “Torture camp” refers to privately owned buildings used by 
traffickers for the forcible extortion of ransom. In an interview conducted with him, Yemane 
described his experiences in the torture camp as follows: 
I was shackled – my legs and hands were bound by metal chains along with nine 
others. The traffickers […] put us naked and began torturing us by pouring 
melted plastic on our bodies. Although we cried and begged our families to pay 
[the ransom], none of our families could pay. Within seven months, all nine 
victims died. I broke my legs and hands but did not die. Finally, my family and 
relatives contributed $18,000 to release me from the hell. 
Yemane could not understand how the world could forget about him and his friends who 
perished. He believes that the world has become unsafe, greedy, and enormously 
unaccountable. 
Yemane’s story is the story of many of the survivors of the Sinai trafficking. Sergel, 
Feruz, Tesfe, Alem, Yonas, Desiet, and Adel are among the survivors of trafficking I spoke 
 
 
to during my fieldwork. They all described the same stories of torture, death, and extortion of 
ransom. They were all tortured with wooden and metal sticks, burned with melted plastic, 
shocked with electricity, hung upside down, maimed with knives, and raped, both in groups 
and individually. They saw their friends being tortured to death in front of them. Each of their 
families paid a ransom ranging between $15,000 and $40,000. 
The Sinai traffickers’ treatment of pregnant women, new-born children, and dead 
bodies was equally despicable. In the torture camps, children of victims were born with 
ransom tags, and the families of murdered victims were tricked into paying ransoms. Most of 
the children born in the “torture camps” were the result of rape by the traffickers, although 
there were some children born from pre-trafficking pregnancies (van Reisen et al., 2012; van 
Reisen, 2014). Desiet is a survivor of the Sinai trafficking. She described the horrific death of 
her friend, Bethlehem, as follows: 
A trafficker raped [Bethlehem] several times and she became pregnant. Her 
family could not pay the ransom […] because her ransom was doubled after she 
became pregnant […] and her family did not have it. The Bedouins tortured 
[Bethlehem] every day to extort double ransom [….] She died pregnant, but the 
traffickers deceived her family to collect the ransom. 
Women and children were held hostage on the brink of death. Pregnant women tragically 
died in ways described by Desiet. Unborn children were treated as sources of bonus ransoms, 
while the families of those who died had to pay a ransom.  
Moreover, women who were released by the traffickers while pregnant suffered from 
additional challenges in their host society and had to make tough decisions to end their 
pregnancies. An Israel-based NGO, Physicians for Human Rights, facilitated 165 pregnancy 
terminations for survivors of Sinai trafficking “between November 2010 and March 2011” 
 
 
(Mekonnen & Estefanos, 2011, p. 15). According to research by the NGO, the survivors 
reported sexual abuse and physical assault during the trafficking. 
It is also reported that some hostages might have had their organs harvested for a 
lucrative benefit to the torturers. The issue of organ trade, however, has yet to be fully 
investigated. When I asked the survivors interviewed for this research about the prevalence of 
organ trafficking, their response was that they had “heard” about it. Some of them even 
suggested that organ trafficking was widely used in Sinai trafficking as a “tactic of 
intimidation” for extorsion of ransom. While the scope of this paper is limited, the prevalence 
or non-prevalence of organ trafficking and its operational mechanisms merit further research.  
The primary incentive behind the Sinai trafficking was ransom extortion. Although it 
varied from one group of traffickers to another, ransoms were estimated to range from 
$30,000 to $50,000 in 2012 (van Reisen et al., 2012, p. 39). The more the victims were 
transferred between traffickers in the chain, the greater the ransom became. All captives—
children, women, men, unborn children, and those who died from torture—were expected to 
pay ransoms. According to van Reisen and Mawere (2017), “the most conservative estimate 
of the total value of the human trafficking in trade in Eritreans is over USD 1 billion” (p. 
189). 
Once collected, ransoms were paid in refugee-producing countries such as Eritrea and 
Ethiopia. Transit and destination countries, such as Sudan, Egypt, and Israel, also served as 
sites of illicit investment. Moreover, van Reisen et al. (2012) cite a UN Monitoring Group 
who reported that ransoms had been deposited in a Swiss bank account and that the bank’s 
authorities had been informed. In general, these illicit business networks were widely 
distributed, reaching both state and non-state actors in Africa, Europe, and Asia. 
The Border and Beyond 
 Sinai was used by the traffickers and their collaborators as a buffer zone for the 
 
 
enslavement of rightless refugees. This lawless buffer zone maintained its strategic relevance 
to the destination states by containing the “othered” refugees outside of the realm of any 
political sphere. The very moment the survivors appeared in a sovereign space was the 
moment the destination states called for their removal. They erected regimes of bordering, 
detention, and deportation. By the time the Sinai hostages were freed, they were confronted 
by the borders of the host states. Immediately after release, the survivors found themselves 
between the wired border of Israel and the Sinai desert (van Reisen et al., 2012, p. 73). Their 
appearance at the border provoked the governments of Egypt and Israel to immediately reify 
their borders and single out the survivors for incarceration and elimination (see van Reisen & 
Mawere, 2017). Stripped of protection, some survivors were met with bullets at the border. 
Between 2007 and 2010, at least 85 survivors were killed by Egyptian border security guards 
(Simpson, 2014, p. 68). The shooting continued for several years, and the murder of the 
survivors was normalized.  
 Despite violence at the physical borders, many of the survivors managed to cross 
either to Israel or Egypt with help from human smugglers. For the survivors, however, 
crossing the physical borders was not the only challenge. They were stuck in asylum regimes 
of the countries or subjected to arbitrary detention and deportation. In 2009, for example, 
Israel assumed the mandate of determining the status of refugees from UNHCR but ‘not a 
single Eritrean has been granted asylum since then” (Connell, 2013, p. 37). In January 2012, 
the country amended the 1954 Prevention of Infiltration Law, introducing the term 
“infiltrators” to describe irregular migrants (van Reisen et al., 2012, pp. 74–75). This law was 
originally “associated with Palestinian refugees who were driven or fled from their villages 
during the 1948 Arab – Israeli War and later found themselves on the other side of a hostile 
border” (van Reisen & Borgman, 2014, p. 204). The newly amended law, however, included 
in the category of infiltrators “desperate refugees from Eritrea and Sudan in Tel Aviv, fleeing 
 
 
desolate situations back home and hoping to find a save heaven” (van Reisen and Borgman, 
2014, p. 210). Outlawed by the new law, the survivors were denied asylum rights and put in 
arbitrary detention, only to face deportation and endure another cycle of imprisonment in 
their home countries. 
 The survivors who met their flight costs and were admitted by Ethiopian authorities 
were transferred to Ethiopia. On their arrival in Ethiopia, the survivors had to seek asylum in 
the country’s refugee camps. Feven, one of the survivors transferred to Ethiopia, described 
her experience as follows:  
For the last six years, I have been moving from one detention to another. First, I was in 
prison in Eritrea for evading national service and then kidnapped by traffickers. Then, I 
was arrested by Egyptian police right after I was released from Sinai and put in Qanatir 
[prison in Egypt] for two years… I am now in Ethiopia going between a refugee camp 
and a nearby town. I feel I was born to live in prison… I wish I would die in dignity. 
Feven was not the only survivor trapped in the continuum of incarceration. Many other 
survivors have remained in camps, detention facilities, or shantytowns for a prolonged time. 
They end one cycle of detention and begin another. 
Seeking Asylum and Durable Solutions 
 The survivors lost their humanity while in torture camps or in encounters with the 
sovereign, but their dignity also continued to be degraded while securing refugee status from 
the UNHCR. Upon their arrival in Cairo, often entering the mainland from Sinai with the 
help of smugglers, the survivors had to exhibit victimhood. The International Organization 
for Migration (IOM) needed to recognize the survivors as victims of trafficking (VOTs) for 
fast-tracked registration with the UNHCR. Often, survivors who narrated tragic testimonies 
and showed their bruised bodies were granted VOT status. The recognition from IOM was 




Once their immediate needs were met and registration with the UNHCR was 
complete, the VOTs had to wait for several months or more than a year for a Refugee Status 
Determination (RSD) interview. During the RSD interview, UNHCR eligibility officers 
produced testimonies for legal status determination by intensively questioning the survivors 
(Egypt UHNCR Regional Representation, 2013, p. 42). The interviews explored detailed 
personal stories, and the survivors were expected to exhibit victimhood. The informants for 
this paper recalled how they were thoroughly questioned about their entire life story, 
including the traumatic experiences in Sinai. Sara, a young woman from Eritrea, lamented:  
I was interviewed four times before my case was referred to a third country for 
resettlement: IOM interview, yellow card interview [registration interview], blue card 
interview [RSD interview], and UNHCR resettlement interview […] They ask you like 
how many times you were raped and how many people raped you. Why? Why every 
time? 
While making asylum claims, the survivors’ subjectivity—initially produced through 
notorious trafficking—was shaped by the UNHCR’s RSD process. To process and decide 
asylum claims, as Sara noted, the UNHCR conducted a series of interviews focusing on 
individual narratives and experiences. This confessionary process depended on asylum 
seekers’ stories, tears, and bruises to grant them refugee status. They were required to 
construct and produce a passive and vulnerable subjectivity, regardless of any legal benefits 
involved. It functioned to translate their suffering into asylum claims and refugee status.  
In the case of the Sinai victims, the asylum process failed to ensure the dignity of the 
survivors and remained silent about the horrific treatment the survivors faced in Sinai. 
Questions of justice and redress by the survivors were banished in the UNHCR’s archives. 
Survivors who were granted refugee status and referred for resettlement faced a 
continuing process of indignation and bureaucratization. Testimonial extraction from the 
 
 
survivors continued by the relocating countries if they secured a spot for relocation. After a 
referral for resettlement was made, the survivors still had to pass successive interviews, 
security checks, medical examinations, and biosecuritization of their bodies. Tesfa is a former 
VOT, and she described her experience of the resettlement process to the UK as follows: 
Not only my body but also my soul felt the pain of standing naked in front of a 
male doctor who, for preparing a medical report [for a third country], vigilantly 
checked every bruise on my body from toe to head. I felt the same when the 
traffickers, who tattooed the bruises in my body, put me naked… and burnt me 
with a cigarette butt. 
Tesfa’s experience of the resettlement process indicates radical erosion of the survivors’ 
human dignity. In the process of negotiating durable solutions, the survivors were, at worst, 
subjected to further dehumanizing treatment or, at best, reminded of their enslavement in 
Sinai.  
Following an exhaustive resettlement process, Sinai survivors hoped to start a new 
and dignified life. However, they struggled to overcome their past traumatic experiences and 
the challenges of living in a new society. They also faced the burden of helping those who 
helped them survive trafficking. After their release, they felt such a duty to care for their 
families who had lost everything they had to rescue them. Mustafa, for example, described 
his circumstances as follows: 
I still have silent wounds that nobody knows but me and my mum. My cousin 
contributed $10,000 for my ransom, which she saved working five years in a 
cleaning job. Recently, her young brother was kidnapped by traffickers in 
Sudan… and the traffickers demanded $8,000. It was my turn to pay and I did 
so… I do not have money now… My mum is homeless [in Eritrea]. 
Mustafa struggled to choose between saving two lives: his mother, who paid everything for 
 
 
him, and his young cousin, who needed rescue. In fact, Mustafa’s circumstance was not 
exceptional. Many Sinai victims, including three of Mustafa’s former friends, had died, and 
their parents were deceived into paying a ransom. Some others allegedly lost their organs, 
and others, their pregnancies. All of them lost their humanity, dignity, rights, and life goals.  
Discussion 
The “Carceral System” and the “Necropolitics” of Refugee Trafficking  
 Towards the end of his prominent work, Discipline and Punish, Foucault introduces 
the concept of the “carceral system” to examine the operation of the modern prison and its 
failures. The carceral system, Foucault (2020) describes, is “a whole series of institutions 
which [go] well beyond the frontiers of criminal law [and] constituted what one might call 
the carceral archipelago” (p. 297). According to Foucault, the carceral system brings together 
innumerable institutions of discipline, regimes of punishment, and power relations. Foucault 
asserts that the prison, with its function, reforms, and failures anchored in the sovereign 
biopolitics and diffused into society, is at the heart of the carceral system. For him, the prison 
is not an isolated building but, rather, an integral part of a carceral system that punishes and 
disciplines societies.  
The purpose of the prison, according to Foucault, is to produce “delinquency”—a 
concept that tends to replace “detainee” in Foucault’s analysis. In Foucault’s (2020) terms, 
“delinquency” is “a specific type, a politically or economically less dangerous—and, on 
occasion, usable—form of illegality” (p. 277). The purpose of the carceral system is “to 
isolate, organize, and penetrate” delinquents (Friberg, 2010, p. 3). It sets apart delinquents 
from the rest of the society so that they can be easily disciplined, controlled, and monitored. 
Isolated from the social milieu, the delinquent “experiences a fundamental disconnect with 
societal norms and behaviors” (Friberg, 2010, p. 4). Thus, the delinquent rotates in a cycle of 
 
 
unending illegality and constant recidivism. Interestingly, the violence against such 
persons—marginalized, illegalized, and clearly identified persons—is strategically hidden 
from view. 
Foucault’s concept of the carceral system that produces delinquency offers a 
framework for understanding the trafficking of refugees in Sinai. The application of this 
framework in Sinai trafficking, however, requires examining two biopolitical questions: the 
status of refugees in political life and the link between the torture camp regulated by the 
traffickers and the carceral system. To unpack these questions, I refer to Arendt’s notion of 
the “right to have rights” and Agamben’s “state of exception” that is inhabited by “bare life.” 
According to Arendt (2017), stateless and involuntarily displaced people suffer from 
triple losses: loss of home, loss of community, and “loss of government protection” (p. 384). 
Explaining these triple losses, Arendt eloquently articulates: 
Once they had left their homeland, they remained homeless; once they had left 
their state, they become stateless; once they had been deprived of their human 
rights, they were rightless, the scum of the earth. (p. 349) 
Obviously, Arendt’s argument is grounded in the historical contexts of the holocaust and 
involuntary displacement caused by World War II. Regardless of time and context, however, 
her discussion of the treatment of forcibly displaced immigrants, their rights, and their status 
in modern political life brings forth a perspective relevant to the current refugees’ 
circumstances. Her argument resonates with the suffering of multiple generations of 
Palestinians, decades-long involuntary displacement of Eritreans, and the recent displacement 
of Syrian refugees. 
Arendt’s seminal ideas and her assumptions have been subjected to intense scrutiny 
by philosophers, political theorists, and migration scholars. Philosopher and political theorist 
Giorgio Agamben offers a nuanced examination of the precarious status of the refugee in 
 
 
modern biopolitical life. Agamben agrees with Arendt’s argument that the so-called 
“inalienable” characteristics of human rights crumble for the refugee because the refugee is 
excepted from political life. Noting that the refugee breaks the distinction “between man and 
citizen,” Agamben (1995) argues, “When the rights of man are no longer the rights of the 
citizen, then he is truly sacred, in the sense that this term had in archaic Roman law: destined 
to die” (p. 117). This sacred life—a form of life that can be killed with impunity—represents 
the “bare life” in Agamben’s political theory. For him, the refugee has no access to political 
life and is thus sacred. Once involuntarily displaced from the homeland and inescapably 
omitted from making a home elsewhere, as Arendt explains, the refugee remains not only 
homeless but also rightless. Put differently, refugees are relegated to a form of life upon 
which any act committed against them can no longer be considered a crime. Sinai trafficking 
victims were caught within such a biopolitical system. 
The second point that needs to be made is the link between the torture camp and 
Foucault’s carceral system. As described above, the torture camps were places where the 
refugees were tortured, burned, raped, dismembered, and annihilated with impunity. As 
Mbembe (2019) would argue, the torture camps are the necropolitical spaces in which the 
distinction between life and death disappears, and impunity becomes the norm. As shown, the 
rogue powers from the state and non-state actors colluded to maintain the realm of 
indistinction between life and death in which the refugees were subjected to uncompromising 
brutality. Upon release, victims were exposed to an unending cycle of imprisonment, forced 
removal, and death at the borders (see van Reisen & Mawere, 2017, pp. 72–76).  
 Hidden from view in the deserts of Sinai, the torture camps appear uninhabitable. 
The hidden paradox is that these spaces, devoid of law, represent a complex mutation of 
Foucault’s (2020) “carceral archipelago” (p. 297). They were placed neither outside state 
jurisdiction nor the criminal system but at the “threshold of the law”—the border (Salter, 
 
 
2008, p. 336). Constitutively excluded from the penal system, the torture camps constituted 
the “sovereign sphere” that is, according to Agamben (1998), “the sphere in which it is 
permitted to kill without committing homicide and without celebrating a sacrifice” (p. 53). As 
such, they typified mutations of the carceral system.  
The annihilation of the refugees in necropolitical spaces flourished in the shadows 
cast by the sovereign’s exclusive, obscure biopolitics. The tragedy of the hostages was 
invisible until Egyptian Channel 25 began to broadcast notorious scenes of torture after the 
local public reacted angrily towards the people involved (Mekonnen and Estefanos, 2011, p. 
15). Following Channel 25’s efforts, CNN broadcast Death in the Desert, which revealed the 
barbaric treatment of Sinai hostages (Pleitgen & Fahmy, 2011). Gradually, human rights 
activists, advocates, journalists, families, relatives of victims, and local organizations 
publicized the refugees’ plight. 
Activism and advocacy were challenged by the host states’ lack of political will to 
guarantee minimum levels of protection for refugees. Neither Egypt (where the tragedy 
occurred) nor Eritrea and Sudan (source and transit countries) made the necessary attempts to 
stop trafficking (Fisseha, 2015; van Reisen et al., 2012). Instead, these states allowed human 
smugglers and traffickers to cross their borders with little difficulty to recruit, transport, and 
enslave refugees on the one hand and exclude them from entering their political space on the 
other (Bahlbi, 2016; Simpson, 2014).  
Therefore, the complex necropolitical spectacle of Sinai trafficking was engineered in 
the obscure absence of state protection. The refugees, set apart from the rest of society and 
lacking legal protection, were placed in unremitting sequences of incarceration in these 
necropolitical spaces. They were either commodified and bargained for by “higher bidder” 
traffickers who sought to maximize profits (Bahlbi, 2016, p. 218) or “murdered as examples” 
for lacking value (van Reisen et al., 2012, p. 63). Once taken hostage, the refugees effectively 
 
 
lost everything. They lost their sense of humanity because they were commodified in an illicit 
business. They lost control of their bodies because they were owned by the traffickers and 
their collaborators. They lost their dignity because they were treated as less than human. As 
hostages held in spaces devoid of law, the refugees represent the naked form of life that 
Agamben distinguishes from the political. 
Back from the Brink of Death and Beyond 
 The plight of the trafficked refugees did not end after surviving trafficking. Instead, 
they continued to suffer in Foucault’s “carceral continuum” that stretches from border 
interstices and deportation regimes to the bureaucratization of care and compassion by 
humanitarian organizations (Betts et al., 2011). As Arendt (2017) reminds us, once they are 
identified and singled out as “the scum of the earth” by the sovereign, they remain “the scum 
of the earth” everywhere (p. 349). Following Arendt’s line of argument, I employ Agamben’s 
“state of exception” to investigate the fates of survivors beyond the necropolitical spaces in 
Sinai. 
Sinai trafficking is a complex and tragic story in which innocent refugees were 
reduced to “objects” of exploitation. Fisseha (2015) notes that the Sinai trafficking involved 
elements of “crimes against humanity,” “genocide,” and “war crimes.” Similarly, va Reisen 
(2014) describes the tragedy as “a crime against life itself” (p. 281). Though these 
descriptions might seem overstated, what is indisputable about Sinai trafficking is that 
refugees were robbed of their dignity, rights, and humanity. Even more striking is the fact 
that it was committed with complete impunity. Neither the traffickers who exploited the 
refugees nor the states that were involved in the trafficking or failed to protect the refugees 
were held accountable for these crimes (Fisseha, 2015; van Reisen et al., 2012). This 
systemic failure and the attitude of denial, as Agamben would argue, are linked to the 
 
 
depoliticization of refugees’ lives. Singled out as a naked form of life and outside of the reach 
of the law, I argue that Sinai hostages were banished to a realm of active, unrelenting, and 
egregious violence with impunity. 
Limitations  
This paper has two potential limitations which should be noted. First, as argued, Sinai 
trafficking was a complex human tragedy that involved various state and non-state 
participants. This paper does not provide primary evidence from all of them, instead it places 
strong focus on survivor testimonies for primary data. Gathering primary data from human 
traffickers, humanitarian organizations, and border security agencies of the origin, transit, and 
destination countries might provide a broader picture of this complex problem. For example, 
the survivor testimonies shrouded in secrecy in UNHCR and IOM archives might reveal a 
larger data set. Despite repeated attempts, I did not succeed in accessing information from 
these organizations. This access to information limitation was mitigated by designing an 
integrated data set and performing a theoretical analysis of the data from primary and 
secondary sources on focused themes: the status of these refugees in modern political life, 
and the impunity with which the crime of trafficking was inflicted upon them. As Tyldum 
(2010) perceptively points out, the best empirical and theoretical understanding of regionally 
and temporally defined trafficking crimes can be achieved “only when we have produced a 
number of thematically focused, local studies on clearly defined populations…and look for 
overreaching patterns and regional, or even local trends” (p. 11). Thus, this shortcoming did 
not prevent examination of the impunity and the status of the refugees in modern political 
life.  
          Second, among the interviewees’ key demands were the assignment of responsibility, 
and justice for the lives lost as well as the physical injuries and trauma suffered. In an 
 
 
interview conducted in July 2017, Yonas, a former political science graduate in Eritrea and a 
survivor of the Sinai trafficking, stated:  
You know, our situation is not merely about human rights, nor is it about media 
coverage. We have been forgotten as human beings; our humanity is obfuscated. 
We are tortured, raped and burned like poisonous snakes. And all these are 
happening with impunity. We need justice. We need our humanity back. Period. 
This was especially true for the majority of the survivors interviewed for this study. 
Therefore, feedback from the interviewees was that the study was limited in its ability to 
make a real difference in their lives. However, assigning responsibility and seeking justice 
are beyond the scope of this paper. These require further investigative research. 
Conclusion 
 Sinai trafficking is a tragedy borne not by accident but by an exclusive politicization 
of life that produces lives deemed unworthy of protection. In this article, I explored the link 
between the survivors’ status in modern politicized life and trafficking crimes committed 
against them. I have argued, alongside Arendt and Agamben, that the greatest loss the Sinai 
victims suffered was a lack of state protection. Once removed from any legal definition and 
sovereign protection, refugees were confined to a realm of active, unrelenting, and egregious 
violence for the ransom extortion. They were initially enslaved in a lucrative illicit business 
regulated by organized criminals and, then, by the sovereign’s carceral regimes. Placed in 
carceral spaces, they lost their human dignity and security. They were dehumanized not only 
in the torture camps, at the borders, and in detention centers but also in the vetting 
bureaucracy deployed while granting refugee status and relocation.  
Most survivors may have since been resettled in countries such as the United States, 
United Kingdom, Canada, Australia, and Scandinavian countries. Some are still stranded in 
 
 
transit countries, such as Ethiopia and Egypt. Once uprooted, the survivors continue to be 
persecuted in their new destinations, and their right to a dignified life remains uncertain. As 
Isayev (2018, p. 9) states, “the dimension of physical placidness became part of the difficulty 
in accessing human rights.” Put differently, physical protection granted on humanitarian 
grounds has not been proceeded with “membership privileges of the [host] community” 
(Isayev, 2018, p. 9). Instead, the survivors are relegated to apolitical life in the ways 
Agamben describes. Likewise, as Mustafa noted, many of the survivors continue to deal with 
the traumatic experience they have been through and the burden of caring for their families 
and friends who have lost everything trying to rescue them.  
Another poignant feature of Sinai trafficking highlighted in this article is the impunity 
with which the tragedy was subsequently treated. The survivors’ testimonies and demands for 
justice and redress were either shrouded in secrecy within the UNHCR’s archives or 
unheeded in their new destination states. To use Kramer's (2017) expression, the voice and 
harrowing testimonies of the survivors continue to remain “shards of radical potential buried 
in the sedimentation of the political present” (p. 12). If questions of redress were to come to 
the fore, an independent and comprehensive investigation would be necessary. For such an 
investigation to take place, however, “a political will that recognises their socio-cultural 
intelligibility” (Yohannes, 2020, p. 215), and their demands for justice would be essential. 
Also, any inquiry into complicity must include tracing the violent power relations that 
radiated from the state actors that allowed the traffickers to operate with impunity. Doing so 
would require participatory and collaborative engagement with the survivors that protects 
their human dignity and allows their voices to be heard. This, I think, requires collaborative 
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